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1. Introduction 
The following, rather stylized facts, characterize most advanced countries. 
Fact 1. Human capital and physical capital are complementary factors of production. An 
increase in the availability of either one tends, ceteris paribus, to increase the productivity 
of the other. 
Fact 2. Credit markets for financing investment in human capital are very rare and, for 
the primary and secondary school levels, altogether absent. 
Fact 3. Human capital accumulation is largely financed by public taxation, at least at the 
primary and secondary level and, in many countries, even at more advanced levels. Actual 
provision of schooling does take place in a variety of different forms, some of which involves 
private producers, but costs are generally covered by taxes. 
Fact 4. Old-age public pension systems are, almost always, of the pay-as-you-go type and 
are usually financed by means of a social security tax which is levied only on lab or income. 
Fact 5. The amount of public resources going into education is established annually by 
means of the budget legislation. These amounts are relatively stable on a year by year 
base but they vary, sometime substantially, over longer time horizons. Public education is 
financed, mostly, by general taxation. 
Fact 6. Many public pension systems are of the "defined benefit type" in which a cer-
tain pension amount is being promised to elderly citizens satisfying certain contributive 
requirements. A number of other pension systems are of the "defined contribution type", 
in which the actual payments are not explicitly set beforehand, but depend upon circum-
stances that will be fully determined only at retirement time. In either case, the actual 
pension payments and social security contributions are determined by ordinary legislation 
and, very often, by the yearly government budget. 
Fact 7. Constitutions and ordinary legislation do not establish any explicit link between 
the public education system and the public pension system. Barring the aggregate resource 
constraint, there is no clear connection between the amount spent on education in one year 
and the level of pension payments during that or any subsequent year. Likewise, we are 
not aware of any welfare system linking the amount of public education received with the 
level of social security contributions levied during one's working life. 
The ongoing political and economic debate on the financial crisis of public pension systems 
concentrates on three themes: 
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(i) that demographic evolution has made pay-as-you-go pension systems not longer viable; 
(ii) that current pensions provide the elderly with a rate of return on their past social 
security contributions which is economically unsustainable and socially unjustifiable; 
(iii) that a transition to a fully funded pension system, in which workers' contributions are 
invested in the capital market and pensions paid out of the capitalized value, would 
lead to a socially superior outcome. 
We do not question either the logical or the empirical validity of these statements. 
Indeed, we believe there are serious arguments supporting each of them (compare, e.g. 
World Bank (1994)). Nevertheless, we suggest here a different point of view for evaluating 
pay-as-you-go pension systems. Our point of view stresses the economic and political links 
between public pensions and publicly financed education systems. This has both positive 
and normative implications. In section 5 we use our model to evaluate the "intergen-
erational fairness" of the current Spanish Public Education and Public Pension (PEPP) 
system. The same model may also be adopted as a guideline for redesigning the insti-
tutions of the welfare state in a Pareto improving direction. Our own appraisal of such 
normative implications is contained in the concluding section. We move next to discuss 
the motivations for the model we use and its relation with the stylized facts listed above. 
Markets in which credit can be obtained to finance investment in individual's human 
capital are not frequent. Indeed, there are well understood reasons for which such markets 
are difficult to set up and sustained over time (see, e.g. Becker (1975)). It is also well 
understood that, in the absence of such borrowing-lending opportunities, the competitive 
equilibrium will not realize an efficient allocation of resources, either static or dynamic. 
Further, in a context in which continuous accumulation of human capital is necessary for 
persistent economic growth, the lack of credit markets may also be the cause of economic 
stagnation. In our model we try to capture these facts by setting up an overlapping 
generations model in which individuals live for three periods, in which both human and 
physical capital are useful in the production of aggregate output, and in which the young 
agents have no physical resources to invest in acquiring their own education. We also 
assume parents and grandparents (middle age and old individuals, respectively) are selfish 
and do not have an incentive for investing directly in their own descendants. 
The reader may suspect that the last, somewhat unrealistic, assumption delivers the 
bulk of our conclusions. This is not so. Parental altruism, to the extent that it does not 
fully internalize the welfare of all future generations thereby transforming the overlapping 
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generation economy into one of infinitely lived dynasties, would only attenuate but not 
eliminate the inefficiencies we mentioned. In particular, parental altruism by itself cannot, 
in general, provide the "right" amount of investment in human capital. This is because 
parents, even when they care for the consumption or the human capital level of their 
progenies, cannot internalize the impact on the productivity of physical capital of an 
increase in the aggregate stock of human capital. 
When markets are complete, the equilibrium of our model displays persistent growth 
and both static and dynamic efficiency. When markets are not complete, economic growth 
is reduced or eliminated altogether and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. Such 
a negative outcome could be overcome if the members of subsequent generations were 
capable of implementing a repeated sequence of intergenerational transfers. 
Long run intergenerational public contracts involving the members of different cohorts 
are seldom, if ever, explicitly embodied in ordinary legislation or even constitutional laws. t 
In spite of this, it is not obvious that such contracts could not emerge by themselves, as 
implicit in the equilibria of properly defined political games among citizens of successive 
cohorts. Voting rules and public institutions may be designed to define such games and to 
favor the selection of certain, socially desirable, equilibrium strategies. When this happens, 
one would expect to see actual legislation supporting such equilibria "de facto" even if not 
"de jure". We show here that this conjecture, suggested by Becker and Murphy (1988) in 
an informal context, holds true in a formal model of sequential political choice and explains 
remarkably well the current Spanish PEPP system. 
As a matter of history, during the last century and a half we have witnessed first the 
introduction and then the expansion of public education and public pension systems in 
most advanced countries. Formally speaking the two systems were introduced indepen-
dently one from the other. On the other hand, their adoption and expansion were strictly 
sequential. More precisely, in all cases we are aware of, public education was introduced 
before, sometime one or even two generations before, public insurance for the elderly. The 
same ordering was followed in most subsequent enlargements of the two systems. Public 
discussion over these issues, as well as common sense, often suggests a link between the 
"generosity" of one generation with its progenies and the implicit "debt" of gratitude that 
the latter owes the former. The metaphorical image of a society as a "family" in which 
t l'.Iany constitutions mention explicitly either one or both kinds of intergenerational transfer. Still we have 
not found a single one in which public education and public pension provision are linked to each other. 
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parents care for their children in the expectation that the latter will reciprocate later on, is 
too often used, and maybe abused, to need reminding here. Becker and Murphy (1988) use 
these and other arguments to support the idea that PEPP systems may be held together 
by an implicit "intergenerational contract" through which agents of different generations 
achieve the efficient outcome by attributing to the state the allocational role which was 
played by the family in the past and that, for the aforementioned reasons, cannot yet 
be exercised by the markets. We share this intuition. Still, those same arguments leave 
wide open the question of how such an advantageous intergenerational contract can be 
implemented when a benevolent central planner is not around to dictate it. 
In this paper, the model sketched above is used to address this question. Assuming 
that credit markets to finance the young are absent we ask if, under a mechanism for 
collective decision making other than the benevolent central planner, a PEPP system 
would be implemented and how close it could come to achieve full efficiency. We let our 
agents play a dynamic, majority voting game and look at the subgame perfect equilibria 
of this game. In fact we study two specifications of this game, where the differences are 
dictated by Fact 7 above, and characterize their equilibrium outcomes. In our view the 
two games capture, in a stylized fashion, the most important institutional characteristics 
of modern welfare states. 
l\1odeling the PEPP system along the lines we have adopted is, without doubts, quite 
restrictive. From the point of view of political theory, one cannot rule out constitutions in 
which taxes other than those we consider could be viable means to implement intergener-
ational transfer schemes. Also, there is no reason that simple majority voting be adopted 
as a decision rule, voting does not need to take place once per generation, and so on. We 
make no claim that the particular form of intergenerational contract we are studying is 
the only possible equilibrium of some general voting game. We claim, instead, that the 
equilibria described below in Section 3 and 4 are supported by a set of social institutions 
and generational believes that are not unlike those we observe in reality. The, relatively 
detailed and careful, analysis of the Spanish case which we carry out in Section 5 provides 
a surprisingly strong support to the latter statement. 
The remaining of the paper contains the following material. In section 2 we introduce 
the economic model, characterize the competitive equilibrium when markets are complete 
and when credit markets for financing human capital are missing. Section 3 illustrates 
first a lump-sum tax and transfer scheme that would restore efficiency when markets are 
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incomplete. We introduce next the voting games our agents play and characterize their 
properties. We show under which circumstances the complete market allocation may and 
may not be supported as a SPE of our dynamic political games. Section 4 illustrates 
these conditions by means of two examples. Section 5 reports empirical findings based on 
Spanish data, they appear to support the predictions of our model. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Basic Model 
2.1 Complete Markets 
We study an economy composed of overlapping generations of identical agents living 
for three periods. Each generation is composed by a continuum, of size one, of identical 
individuals. 
In each period t = 0,1,2, ... , physical, kt, and human, ht, capital are owned, respec-
tively, by the old and the middle age individuals. Aggregate output of the homogenous 
commodity is Yt = F(ht, kt ), where F(h, k) is a constant return to scale and neoclassical 
production function. 
At the beginning of each period a new generation of young agents is born. They own 
no productive capital. Instead, they are endowed with a stock hr of basic knowledge which 
can be used to acquire human capital. Hence, if they spend time and money at school 
their human capital becomes ht+l = h(dt , hn when middle age. Here dt is the amount of 
homogenous good invested in the educational process. It is meant to comprise both direct 
and opportunity costs. The function h(d, hY ) is a constant return to scale neoclassical 
production function which also satisfies a number of additional technical properties to 
be specified momentarily. During the second period of their life, individuals work and 
carry out consumption-saving decisions. When old, they consume the total return on their 
savings before dying. 
We assume agents draw utility from (cr, cf+l) denoting, respectively, consumption 
when middle age and old. Neither leisure nor the welfare of their descendants affect utility. 
Let the homogenous commodity be the numeraire. In each period t = 0,1,2, ... , out-
put Yt is allocated to three purposes: aggregate consumption (Ct = cr + cr), accumulation 
of next period's physical capital (kt+l) and investment in education (df). Human and phys-
ical capital are hired by firms at competitive prices equal, respectively, to Wt = Fl (ht, kt ) 
and 1 + r t = F2 (ht, kt ). Aggregate saving is allocated, through competitive credit markets, 
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to finance investments in physical and human capital (St = kt+1 + dn, accruing a total 
return equal to (1 + rt+I)St = Rt+lst . 
The life-cycle optimization problem for the agent born in period t - 1 is 
d Wtht 
subject to : 0 :::; dt - I :::; Ht 
c"; + St + R td1-I :::; Wtht 
C~+I :::; Rt+lst 
ht = h(dt_I' hLI) 
Consumption-saving behavior is summarized by the two first order conditions: 
(2.1) 
(2.2a) 
(2.2b) 
Competitive equilibrium is defined by the following set of equalities (subscripts, as 
usual, indicate partial derivatives): 
F(ht, kt ) = C"; + c~ + St 
FI (ht, kt ) = Wt 
F2 (ht , kt ) = Rt = Wthl(dt- l , hLI) 
St = d~ + kt+1 
# = d~ = dt 
(2.3a) 
(2.3b) 
(2.3c) 
(2.3d) 
(2.3e) 
Solving (2.2) and (2.3) yields a dynamical system <I> : (kt, ht ) f-7 (kt+I' ht+l ) which, 
given the initial conditions (ko, ho) and d_l? induces the equilibrium path {(kt, hd} ::'0' 
The algebra leading from (2.2) and (2.3) to <I> can be simplified through a number of 
technical assumptions. Note first that, given the hypothesis that the aggregate production 
function is smooth and neoclassical, the rental-wage ratio R/w is, in equilibrium, a well 
defined and monotone decreasing function of the factor intensity ratio x = k / h, i.e. 
R 
W 
where f(x) = F(l, k/h). The more technical hypotheses are listed next: 
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Assumption 1 The function h : ~! f---? ~+ is smooth. The function 9 : ~! f---? ~+ 
satisfying hdg(x, hY), hYj- w(x) = 0 exists and it is well defined and continuous. 
Assumption 2 The utility function u : ~+ f---? ~+ is strictly monotone increasing, 
strictly concave and smooth. Given numbers I and R both larger than zero, the function 
V(I - z, Rz) = u(I - z) + 8u(Rz) is such that argmaXO<z<I V(I - z, Rz) = S(R, I) has 
the form S(R, I) = s(R) . I, with sC) monotone increasing. 
Assumption 3 For all period t = 0, 1,2, ... the initial endowment, h¥, of the young 
generation satisfies h¥ = J-Lht, J-L > O. 
Under these hypotheses, tedious but straightforward algebra shows that, given dt - 1 , 
the two-dimensional implicit function problem 
ht+l - h[g(Xt+l' ht), ht] = 0 
s[R(Xt+l)] [w(xt)ht - R(xt)dt- 1] - kHl - g(Xt+l' hd = 0 
has a well defined solution 
hHl = <1>1 (ht, kt ) 
kt+ 1 = iJ>2 (ht, kt ) 
(2.4a) 
(2.4b) 
Standard methods can be used to show that, given (ht, kt ) and dt - 1 , the equilibrium 
choice of (ht+ 1, kt+ 1) is unique and induces a Pareto efficient allocation of resources in 
period t. This amounts to "static efficiency": in each period aggregate savings are allo-
cated to equalize rates of return between the investments in physical and human capital. 
Things are less immediate when it comes to dynamic efficiency. In this case one asks 
if, given (ho, ko) and d_ 1 , there exists some feasible path {( kt, h t ) } :0' other than the 
competitive equilibrium, which delivers more consumption during some period t without 
requiring less consumption during any other period. Assumptions 1-3 are sufficient to 
apply the characterization of dynamically efficient paths established by Cass [1972]. The 
original argument needs to be modified to account for the unboundedness of the feasible 
consumption levels. To do this, re-normalize all variables by a factor which grows at the 
equilibrium balanced growth rate and then apply Cass criterion to the normalized, and 
therefore bounded, economy. t 
t Technical details are available from the authors upon request. 
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Depending upon the assumptions one is willing to make about the extent to which 
human and physical capitals can be increased from one period to the next, the dynamical 
system (2.4) mayor may not have a fixed point 
h* = if> 1 (h*, k*) 
k* = if>2(h*, k*), 
other than the one at the origin. If one assumes, as we do, that both h(d, hY ) and F(h, k) 
are homogenous of degree one, then unbounded equilibrium paths are feasible and there 
exist preferences for which unbounded accumulation of both kt and ht is an equilibrium. 
To illustrate this, consider the two examples we use in this paper. 
Example 1. Let u(c) = logc, F(h, k) = kah1- a and h(d, hY ) = )"'(hY )d(3, )... : ~+ f-+ ~+ is 
continuous and monotone increasing. Manipulating the first order conditions we get 
dt-l = ,8(1 - a) k
t 
a 
which, setting (3(l:a) = "( and using the market clearing condition for saving and invest-
ment, gives 
d - ,,(St-l t-l - . 1+,,( 
Aggregate saving is therefore equal to 
S = [8(1 - a)(l - ,8)] [kah1-a] 
t 1+8 t t 
The latter implies 
kt+l = 77 [kfhi-a] (2.5a) 
ht+l = )...( hn ("(77)(3 [kf hi-a] (3 (2.5b) 
where 0 < 77 = 1!8 (1-~~~-(3) < 1. Now let h¥ = ht . Picking specific functional forms for 
)...(-) yields different patterns of long-run behavior. One, none or more than one interior 
steady states may exist and they may be either asymptotically stable or unstable. Similarly, 
balanced growth mayor may not be an equilibrium. A useful specification is )"'(h) = h1-(3. 
The dynamical system (2.5) now reads: 
kt+l = 17(kfh~-a) 
ht+l = ("(17)f3 (k~f3 h;-a(3 ) 
The only rest point of (2.6) is the origin. The ray in the (ht, kt ) plane 
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(2.6a) 
(2.6b) 
(2.7) 
defines a balanced growth path. Straightforward algebra shows that for all initial conditions 
(ho, ko) E ~~ iteration of (2.6) leads (ht, kt ) to the ray x*. 
Along the balanced growth path the two stocks of capital expand (or contract) at the 
factor 
1 + 9 = 17 [ ("(~)f3l1 
1-", 
",(1 (3) 
which is larger than one when 17 > (l/"()(1-a). 
A sufficient condition for the equilibrium path to be dynamically efficient is that the 
gross rate of return on capital be larger or equal than one plus the growth rate of output. 
With linearly homogenous production functions the rate of return on capital is determined 
by the factor intensity ratio. Hence we need 
z. e. that 
x* :::; (
_a ) l/{l-a) 
1+9 
a + ;3(1 - a) 8 
a?17 {:=:::? (1-a)(l-;3) > 1+8 
Example 2. The use of a linear utility function will, in some circumstances, help our 
intuition. Therefore, we work out briefly the case u(c) = c, and keep the same production 
functions as before. The first order conditions of households and firms give 
dd _ ;3(1 - a) k t-l - t 
a 
and St is [Wtht - (1 + rt)df-l]' or the interval [0, Wtht - (1 + rt)df-l]' or 0, if -1 + 8(1 + rd 
is positive, zero, or negative respectively. As before, market clearing gives 
d = "(St-l 
t-l 1 + "( 
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and 
The latter yields 
kt+l = 17[kf hi-a] 
ht+l = ("If1){3 [kf{3 hi-a{3] 
(2.8a) 
(2.8b) 
where 0 < 17 = (1-7~~-{3) < 1. Once again, the only rest point of (2.8) is the origin. The 
ray in the (ht, kt ) plane 
_* kt [17]1 
X = ht = ("!17){3 
00(1 (3) 
(2.9) 
defines a balanced growth path. Straightforward algebra shows that for all initial conditions 
(ho, ko) E at~ solutions to (2.8) converge to the ray x*. 
rate 
Along the balanced growth path the two stocks of capital expand (or contract) at the 
1 + 9 = 17 [ ("I~){3l1 1-00 00(1 (3) 
which is larger than one if 17 > (l/"I)(1-a). 
The parameter values at which dynamic efficiency obtains are 
> _ et + ,8(1 - et) 
et - 1] <===? (1 _ et)(l -,8) > 1 
2.2 Equilibrium when Credit Markets are Missing 
As we pointed out in the introduction, markets to finance education are very rare. In 
our model, lack of borrowing opportunities for the young generation implies that dt = 0 
for all t and, therefore, ht+l = h(O, hf). This restriction would make the complete market 
equilibrium allocation not feasible and, by drastically reducing the investment in human 
capital, lead the economy to an equilibrium with a much lower aggregate growth rate. The 
final outcome would depend, in general, upon the specific properties of the production 
function h(d, hY). For example, in the Cobb-Douglas case the economy collapses to the 
steady state with zero of both capital stocks in just one period. Should we assume h(d, hY) 
to be a CES production function such that h(O, hY) > 0, then ht > 0 could still be 
maintained and positive production and accumulation could still take place even in the 
absence of credit markets. In any case, the associated allocation would not be efficient and 
the long run growth rate of aggregate consumption would be lower. 
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3. Introducing the State 
Our analysis shows that, in the absence of well functioning credit markets profitable 
intergenerational trades are available which could make all citizens better off but which 
cannot be carried out without an outside intervention. In this section we investigate if such 
trades could be achieved through a simple system of intergenerational taxes and transfers. 
Second, and perhaps more important, we ask if, absent a benevolent planner, such system 
can be sustained as the equilibrium of a well defined voting game. 
3.1 Public Financed Education and Pay-As- You-Go Pensions 
Consider the following scheme. In each period t two lump-sum taxes are levied to 
provide resources for two simultaneous lump-sum transfers. 
The first tax is levied only on the middle age generation and its proceedings are used 
to payout a pension to the old-age, retired individuals. We assume a period-by-period 
balanced budget, hence 
(3.1) 
The second tax is instead levied on all income recipients, middle age and elderly alike, 
and its revenues are used to finance investment in the education of the young generation. 
Balanced budget, again, implies 
(3.2) 
The period-by-period budget constraint for the representative member of the generation 
born in period t - 1 is therefore 
c~ + St S; Wtht - Tt - Ttem 
Cf+l S; Rt+l S t + Pt+1 - Tt+-l 
ht = h(dt - b hLl) 
(3.3a) 
(3.3b) 
(3.3c) 
(3.3d) 
where Tt = Ttem + Tteo and the latter denote, respectively, the lump-sum education tax 
levied on the middle age and the lump-sum education tax levied on the old individuals at 
time t. 
Let starred symbols, e.g. d;, w;, etc., denote the equilibrium quantities and prices 
that would arise in the complete market model of Section 2.1. l,From now on, we will 
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refer to this allocation as "the complete market allocation". Comparison of equations 
(3.3) with the budget restrictions in problem (2.1) shows that, if the lump-sum amounts 
(Tt, Pt, Trm, Tteo, Et) are chosen to satisfy 
(3.4) 
then the competitive equilibrium achieves the complete market allocation. In other words, 
a benevolent planner can restore efficiency and improve long-run growth by establishing 
publicly financed education and pay-as-you-go pensions and by linking the two flows of 
payments via the market interest rate factor. 
The scheme just described contains a redundant "double transfer" and, therefore, a 
degree of indeterminacy. In the complete market allocation the middle age generation is 
the only one investing in public education. For this reason, in the tax-and-transfer scheme 
it must ultimately be paying for the whole amount Et. Hence, one can either set Tteo == 0 
and Et = Ttem or let Tteo > 0 be an arbitrary number and set Pt = Tteo + d;_I R; as in 
(3.4). The two settings are equivalent but the second allows the interpretation of Et as 
financed by a general income tax. 
A "Public Education and Public Pension" scheme (PEPP) satisfying restrictions (3.1), 
(3.2) and (3.4) would also be actuarially fair in the following sense. The pension payments 
(contributions) that a typical citizen receives (pays) during the third (second) period of his 
life correspond to the capitalized value of the educational taxes (transfers) he contributed 
(received) during the second (first) period of his life. These quantities are capitalized at 
the market rate of interest. t 
E R* - TP T eo t HI - HI - t+I (3.5a) 
(3.5b) 
Our next step is to inquire if the efficient allocation could be implemented by a simple, 
dynamic game of collective decision making based upon period-by-period majority voting. 
t In the applied literature on contribution-based Social Security systems the issue of "actuarial fairness" 
between contributions paid and pensions received is an actively debated topic. Our model suggests that, maybe, 
one should look for actuarial fairness somewhere else, that is between contributions paid and amount of public 
funding for education received on the one hand, and between taxes devoted to public education and pension 
payments on the other. 
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3.2 Voting upon Public Education and Public Pensions 
Consider the same framework as before but assume that the amounts Pt - Tteo and Et 
are not set by a benevolent planner. Instead assume that, in each period t, the members 
of the middle age and old generations vote on whether and at which level those amounts 
should be levied. Imagine that all conceivable combinations of (positive) taxes Tt, Ttm, Tteo 
and transfers Pt, Et satisfying the budgetary restrictions (3.1) and (3.2) are listed in the 
ballot and that individual voters, being of negligible measure, vote sincerely in favor of the 
proposal they like the best. Votes are then counted and the proposal being supported by 
a (simple) majority of the population is implemented until further voting takes place. To 
avoid the intricacies of voting theory, wich are not our concern here, and to break the tie 
between the two generations assume the middle age population is E > 0 larger than the 
old, for E whatever small. Then the median coincides with the middle age voter. 
This cursory description of the majority voting mechanism is too vague. Indeed, 
it is easy to see that many different "rules of the game" are consistent with the verbal 
description we have just given. One can think of these different sets of rules as different 
"constitutions" , allowing the median voter the right to make some decisions and forbidding 
other. 
We study two such intergenerational voting games which, we believe, come close to 
capturing some important features of real world political decision making on public edu-
cation and pensions. In particular, our two games are consistent with the following facts: 
(i) the amounts invested in education are established year-by-year or over longer spans 
of time, but, in no circumstance, are they fixed once and for all at the outset of the sys-
tem; (ii) pension payments made in any given period are sometimes already established 
by previous legislation and sometimes established by contemporary legislation. 
In both games players cast two independent votes in each period, one upon education 
and one upon pension payments. In the first game, call it the defined benefit game, player 
t also establishes an amount which he should receive, in the form of a net pension, in 
period t + 1. Not receiving such payment is tantamount to the pension system defaulting 
upon its commitment. Default is possible because the period t + 1 player must approve 
or disapprove the pension payment. In the second game, instead, player t is not allowed 
to legislate any promised amount. In each period voters pick the two amounts to be paid, 
respectively, to the old and young generation. We call this the defined contribution game; 
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to the extent that pensions in period t are paid out of social security contributions levied 
in the same period, the name is justified. 
3.2.1 The defined benefit game 
If, at time t, a PEPP does not exist voters must decide to either remain without one 
or to introduce it. To remain without one is equivalent to a (simple) majority of voters 
to favor the (0,0) pair. To introduce a PEPP when one does not yet exist, voters must 
decide (i) which lump-sum education tax Tte should be levied to provide the resources Et, 
(ii) the net transfer (if any) to be paid to the currently old generation, Pt - Tteo , and, 
(iii) a "proposal" to be made for the net transfer PHI - Ttt-I the currently middle age 
individuals will receive next period. 
If a PEPP is already in place the citizens will be asked if they like to disband it or 
not. Keeping it entails paying the promised amount to the old people, deciding an amount 
to transfer to the young and setting a promise for the (net) payment the current player is 
entitled to claim next period. 
Individuals are homogeneous within a given generation and the restrictions introduced 
so far imply only that 
(3.6) 
Given sincere voting, the decisive vote is cast by a member of the middle age gen-
eration. In period t given (kt, ht) and Et-I, the middle age voter is faced by a triple 
choice: 
(a) payor not pay to the elderly the amount Pt - Tteo they expect; 
(b) choose how much, if anything, to invest in the education of the young; 
(c) establish the amount Pt+1 - Tte+'1 to expect next period. 
Paying the promised pension is equivalent to an investment for the middle age. Its 
profitability depends upon the equilibrium strategy adopted by the next player: will he 
pay Pt+1 - Tte+' 1 to her if she pays Pt - Tteo to the elderly? If the answer is "yes", she must 
also compare the amount Pt+1 - Tte+'1 with the payoffs obtainable by investing the amount 
Pt - Tteo somewhere else. Only when the former dominates the latter the pension payment 
\vill be approved. 
The payment in (b) is also an investment but only a portion of its return depends 
upon the equilibrium strategy adopted by the following player. Investing in the education 
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of the young pays off in two ways for the middle age. The first is through the relation, if 
any, that may be established between the amount Et and the amount she can reasonably 
expect to receive as a net pension when old. This portion of the total return on Et does 
depend upon the action of other players and, among other things, may also depend upon 
the choice made at time t of paying or not the amount Pt - Tteo to the current elderly. On 
the other hand, investing in human capital has a second, direct payoff for the middle age 
generation insofar as it increases the equilibrium rate of return on physical capital Rt+ 1. 
As long as the middle age voter expects St > 0 she can try to maximize her total return 
kt+1Rt+1 by wisely choosing Et. 
Finally, the payoff of (c) depends on the equilibrium strategies of the future players, 
on the action of the current player (has she paid the pension in (a)? How much has she 
invested in (b)?) and upon the possibility for player t + 1 to find a Pt+2 - Ttt-2 which looks 
profitable to him and approvable by the next generation, and so on for the infinite future. 
3.2.2 The defined contribution game 
In period t, given the two stocks of capital kt and ht, voters are supposed to pick both 
amounts Et and Pt - Tr under the restrictions (3.6). The middle age voter is the decisive 
one in this case as well. Given sincere voting, she elects two quantities 
(a') how much should be paid to the old generation via the pension system, Pt - TtO ; 
(b') how much, if anything, to invest in the education of the young, Et. 
Paying a pension still can be seen as an investment for the middle age. Its profitability 
depends entirely upon the equilibrium strategy being played by the next generation, more 
precisely it depends upon the rule adopted to determine Pt+1 - Ttt1' Does this generate 
a payoff higher than the one achievable by investing the amount Pt - Tteo somewhere else? 
Only when the former dominates the latter the pension payment will be positive. 
As in the defined benefit game, the return from (b') depends both upon the effect of 
Et on the total return on capital kt+1Rt+1 and upon the equilibrium strategy adopted by 
the next player. 
3.3 Voting 
We now analyze equilibrium voting strategies in the two PEPP games. 
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3.3.1 Voting in the defined benefit game 
Following along the lines of Boldrin and Rustichini (1995), we begin with a simplified 
version of the game. There are countably many players who move sequentially. At time 
t the designated player can choose to give, out of her pocket, an amount Pt - Tteo 2: 0 
to the previous player and an amount Et 2: 0 to the player following her. We allow for 
two independent decisions here: player t may decide to give Pt - Tr to player t - 1 and 
deny the gift to player t + 1 or, viceversa, decide to give only Et to player t + 1 and deny 
Pt - Tteo to the player before her. The logic through which the precise values of Pt - Tteo 
and Et are selected will be determined later and those amounts should be taken as given 
until later in this subsection when the complete defined benefit game will be introduced. 
The action of each player is perfectly observable by all those following her. The actions 
available to each player are 
where Y stands for yes and N stands for no. For a given sequence {Et, (Pt - Tteo)}~o 
the interpretation of the four different actions is the following. (y, Y) corresponds to ac-
cepting both public education and public pensions; (Y,N) corresponds to accepting public 
education but not public pensions; symmetrically (N, Y) shuts down public education and 
maintains public pensions while, finally, (N, N) turns down both transfer systems. 
A history H t - 1 of the game at time t, when it is player's t turn to move, is: 
so that a strategy for player t is a map 
Identify Y with 1 and N with O. The payoff for player t is determined by the value function 
vt : ({O, I} x {a, 1})2 f--> lR defined by 
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Barring the uninteresting case in which the proposed sequences cannot improve upon 
generational autarchy, any of the following three situations may occur 
vt[(1, 0); (1, 0)] ~ vt[(O, 0); (0,0)] for all t. (3.7a) 
vt[(O, 1); (0, 1)] ~ vt[(O, 0); (0,0)] for all t. (3.7b) 
vt[(l, 1); (1, 1)] ~ vt[(O, 0); (0,0)] for all t. (3.7c) 
Inequality (3.7a) is by far the weakest and can be interpreted as follows. The amount 
Et is such that, over the life cycle, the middle age is better off investing in the education 
of the young, even when the latter chooses not to pay her a pension. This relies on the 
fact that an increase in ht+l and a decrease in kt+l (which is what Et accomplishes) may 
raise Rt+1kH1 by enough to compensate for the loss in consumption at time t. As (3.7a) 
implies vt[(l, 0); (0, 0)] ~ vt[(O, 0); (0,0)), each generation of middle age voters will have 
an incentive to introduce a public education system even when all past and future voters 
are electing to do nothing. These circumstances have been considered in some details in 
Boldrin (1994). 
Inequality (3.7b), on the other hand, means that the proposed pension payments are 
such that, by paying Pt - Tr when middle age and receiving Pt+1 - Tt?l when old, 
each generation achieves a higher life time utility than under generational autarchy. Such 
utility gain has two sources. One is the well known reduction of capital over-accumulation 
(Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1977)) while the second is, in analogy with (3.7a), a large 
enough increase in RH1kt+1 brought about by the reduction in kH1 . These are the cases 
considered in Boldrin and Rustichini (1995). 
Restriction (3.7c) combines these two effects together. Notice though that, for a given 
sequence {Et, (Pt - Tteo)}~o this does not imply that the l.h.s of (3.7c) should dominate 
the l.h.s. of either (3.7a) or (3.7b). This is important for our analysis. We have shown 
in Section 2 that the sequence {E;, (Pt - TtO)*}~o implementing the complete market 
allocation requires, in general, that both E; and (Pt - Tteo )* be strictly positive. The 
complete market allocation can therefore be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium 
(SPE) of our voting game only if the equilibrium outcome is {a~ = 1, af = 1 }~o when 
{E; , (Pt - Tteo ) * } ~o is being voted upon. It is easy to see that, for this to be the case, 
restriction (3.7c) is necessary but not sufficient. Indeed we have 
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Proposition 1 Let the candidate sequence {Et, (Pt -Tteo)}~o be given and assume (3.7) 
are true. Furthermore, let 
vt[(I, 1); (1, I)J ~ vt[(I, 0); (1, O)J for all t. 
and 
vt[(I, 1); (1, I)J ~ vt[(O, 1); (0, I)J for all t. 
Then, for all ao, the strategy: 
e_l p- . {P PP} at - ,at - mIn aI ,a2 ,··· ,at-I' t 
for all t ~ 1 is a SPE of the defined benefit game. 
Proof: By definition of SPE, we have to prove that for any subgame given by a history 
7-{t-I, the strategy profile (at, at+I, ... ) restricted to the history 7-{t-I is aN ash equilibrium. 
Notice first that (3.7a - c), the non negativity restrictions on {Et, (Pt - Tteo)}~o and the 
specification of af imply that af = 1 is a SPE. As for af, we have two possible cases. 
Case 1: min{af, ... , af-I} = 0 ; then min{af,···, aLl' an = 0 for any at; so 
af+I(7-{t-I,af) = 0, and so (since vt[(-,O), (-,0)] > vt[(-,I), (,,0)]), the best choice for 
player t is 0, which is equal to min{af,··· ,aLl}' 
Case 2: min{af, .. ·, aLd = 1; then min{af, .. ·, af-I' an = af for all at; then 
af+I(7-{t-I,af) = af. Now from the assumption that vt[(-,I),(-,I)] ~ vt[(-,O),(-,O)] the 
best choice for t is 1, and the claim follows. Q.E.D. 
Our two additional assumptions are very strong. Nevertheless, they are necessary to 
sustain the complete market allocation as a SPE of the political game we are studying, 
as the examples of section 4 will show. The argument in the proof also suggests a strong 
asymmetry in the behavior of the two components of a PEPP system under a defined 
benefit rule. While the public financing of education is a rather "stable" institution, the 
same is not true of pay-as-you-go pension plans. Indeed the model suggests that, when 
one is in place, a one-period default is enough to destroy the credibility of the system for 
. the very long future. This is consistent with our discussion of the different nature of the 
investment in education and the investment in pensions: the return on the second depends 
entirely on the equilibrium behavior of the other players while the return on the first is, 
at least in part, independent from other players' action. 
In the simple version of the defined benefit game that we have analyzed, the amounts 
involved are exogenously given. To obtain a complete model of the PEPP we should 
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endogenize the choice of the lump-sum amounts used. Write Wt = Wtht. In the full defined 
benefit game, a history H t - l at time t is a sequence: 
where for each s E (1, ... , t - 1), Ts = (Es, Ps+I - T;+l) E [0, ws) x [0, ws+d and as E 
{Y,N}. 
The interpretation of the action space is the following. Player t chooses a level Et ~ ° 
of public education financing and proposes a net pension payment PHI - Tttl she should 
receive next period. Finally, the binary action at amounts to approving or not the payment 
Pt - Tr she is being requested by the currently old generation. 
Take now any infinite history H == {(aI, T I), ... , (at, Tt), ... ,}. We say: 
Definition 1 The defined benefit game is the extensive form game where: 
(1) players are indexed by t = (1,2, ... ); 
(2) the action set of each player is {Y,N} x [O,Wt] x [O,Wt+l]; the strategy of player t is 
a map (jt : Ht - l r--+ {y, N} x [0, wtl x [0, Wt+l]; 
(3) for every history H of actions, the payoff to player t is equal to the lifetime utility 
of the representative agent born at time t - 1 in the competitive equilibrium of the 
economy with {Et, (Pt+l - Tte+I)}~O in the budget constraints (3.3). 
Definition 2 For a given initial condition (ko, ho, d_ l ), a political equilibrium is a 
sequence {at,Tt,wt,Rt,c;n,cf+l,ht,kd~o such that: 
(1) the sequence {Wt, R t , c;n, Cf+l' ht, kd~o is a competitive equilibrium given {at, Td~o; 
(2) there exists a sequence of strategies {(jd~o for the defined benefit game, which is 
a subgame perfect equilibrium, and such that {Td~o is the sequence of effective 
lump-sum taxes and transfers associated with the equilibrium history. 
One can use the latter definition to re-interpret Proposition 1. It says that any se-
quence of taxes and transfers {Et, (Pt - Tr}~o satisfying 
(3.8a) 
(3.8b) 
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(3.8c) 
for all alternative sequences 0 ~ Et + (Pt - ita) ~ Wt for all t, may be an equilibrium of 
the defined benefit game. 
As it is often the case in repeated or dynamic games, the set of SPE is very large. It 
should be clear from the previous discussion that the complete market allocation may be 
one of them, under certain parametric restrictions. The nature of these restrictions will 
be illustrated in section 4, by means of our two examples. We will discuss momentarily, 
in subsection 3.4, the predictions of our model for the case in which the complete market 
allocation obtains as a SPE. The empirical analysis of Section 5 is meant to shed some 
light upon the extent to which such predictions are corroborated by actual data. 
3.3.2 Voting in the defined contribution game 
As in the previous game there are count ably many players who move sequentially. 
Their actions are perfectly observable by all following players and predictable by all previ-
ous players. At time t the designated player chooses to give, out of her income Wtht = Wt, 
an amount Pt - Tteo 2: 0 to the previous player and an amount Et 2: 0 to the player 
following her. Also in this case the two choices are, a-priori, independent. 
The set of actions available to each player is 
At = {at = (a~,an E [0,Wt]2; a~ +af ~ wt} 
A history H t - l of the game at time t, when it is player's t turn to move, is: 
and a strategy for player t is a map 
(Jt = ((Jf, (Jr) : H t - l 1--+ At. 
The payoff for player t is determined by the value function Ut (At x AHI ) 1--+ R+ 
defined by 
subject to : c;n + St ~ Wt - af - a~ 
and : C~+l ~ Rt+l St + af+l 
Take now any infinite history H = {al,'" ,at, ... ,}. Formally we say: 
Definition 3 The defined contribution game is the extensive form game where: 
(1) players are indexed by t = (1,2, ... ); 
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(2) the action set of each player is At; the strategy of player t is a map O"t : 7-lt- 1 ~ At; 
the payoff of each player is the function Ut : (At x At+ 1) ~ ~+ 
(3) for every history 7-l of actions, the payoff to player t is equal to the lifetime utility 
of the representative agent born at time t - 1 in the competitive equilibrium of the 
economy with {Et = aL (Pt - Tteo ) = an~o in the budget constraints (3.3). 
A political equilibrium can be easily defined by appropriately modifying Definition 
2 of the previous subsection. We now proceed to characterize one, important, class of 
equilibria for the defined contribution game. 
We begin by noticing that, in the defined contribution game, a class of relatively 
simple rvIarkovian strategies is compatible with sub-game perfectness. To put it formally 
Proposition 2 Let ko and ho be given. Assume the sequence of non-negative real valued 
functions {at (kt, ht ) = (af (kt, hd, af( kt, ht ))} ~o satisfy 
UT [aT(kT' hT); aT+1 (kT+1' hT+1)] ~ UT [(a~, a~); (a~+l (kT+1, hT+1), 0)] (3.10) 
for all T ~ 0, where 
- The pair (a~, a~) is a one-period deviation from (a~ (kT' hT ), a~ (kT' hT )); 
- {(kt, ht)}~o are the competitive equilibrium stocks of capital for an economy as in 
(3.3), with initial conditions (ko, ho) and sequences of taxes and transfers equal to 
Et = af(kt, ht} and Pt - Tteo = af(kt , ht). 
- The pair (kT+1,hT+d obtains from (kT,hT) under the one-period deviation (a~,a~). 
Then the strategies {O"; = (O"f*, O"f*) } ~o defined as 
O"t = aHkt , ht), 
O"r = af(kt, ht); if at-1 = 0":_1' 
O"f* = 0; otherwise. 
are a SPE of the defined contribution game. 
Proof: 
The proof is straightforward once we realize that inequality (3.10) also implies that 
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where the pair (kt+l,lit+l ) obtains from (kt,ht) under the deviation (a~,af). The latter 
means that punishing a deviator is better than entering into a further deviation. Q.E.D. 
The equilibrium strategies considered in proposition 2 are quite different from those 
derived, for the defined benefit game, in proposition 1. In fact they are Markovian, i. e. 
current actions only depend upon the current state of the world and the actions of the 
immediately previous player. The current state of the economy matters in determining 
the current action, as the amounts a~ and af are functions of (kt, ht) and change with 
them. Notice, in particular, that a one-period deviation moves k and h away from the 
values they would have assumed if the deviation had not occurred. Hence, equilibrium 
quantities a~ and af must depend upon realized stocks of capital. Markovianity has an 
important, practical, implication. In proposition 1 the equilibrium strategies depend upon 
the whole past history; hence a one-time deviation implies a dismissal of the pension system 
forever. This is not true in the case of proposition 2: a deviation in period t only requires 
a punishment in period t + 1. Payment of the equilibrium pension may resume in period 
t + 2. This prediction appears to be less farfetched than the former. The equilibrium 
generated by cri allows the generations following a deviating one to re-capture the benefits 
of the PEPP system. and predicts that the political game would not lead players to leave 
unexploited some profitable intergenerational arrangements. 
An important application of proposition 2 is the following. Let ko, ho and h-I be 
given and denote with starred symbols the quantities and prices that would arise in a 
competitive equilibrium with complete markets starting at (ko, ho, h_ I ). Denote with E; 
and Pt = Pt - Tteo the sequences of lump-sum taxes and transfers satisfying (3.1), (3.2) 
and (3.4). Recall, again, that both E; and Pt are functions of the current stocks kt and 
ht . Assume that in each period t and for any feasible deviation (a~, af) 
(3.11) 
where the pair (kt+I' ht+l ) obtains from (k;, hn under the deviation (a~, af). Then the 
strategy 
P* R*E* crt = tt-I' 'f * 1 at-I = crt-I; 
crf* = 0, otherwise. 
23 
satisfies proposition 2 and, therefore, is a SPE of the defined contribution game. When 
(3.11) holds this strategy supports the complete market allocation as an outcome of the 
political equilibrium. 
3.4 The efficient allocation as an equilibrium of the political game 
The analysis carried out in the previous subsection suggests that the complete market 
allocation may be achievable even when a benevolent planner is not around to dictate it. 
It also shows, though, that when each generation is allowed to choose taxes and transfers 
many other equilibria are achievable, which are not necessarily efficient, and that each 
generation is faced by incentives that only under certain parametric restrictions may lead 
it to choose the complete market quantities E; and Pt. 
When the complete market allocation satisfies conditions (3.8) it will be emerge as an 
equilibrium of defined benefit game. Similarly, when it satisfies (3.11) it will be chosen in 
the defined contribution game. Both conditions are relatively strong and, as the examples 
of section 4 show, they are satisfied only for certain subsets of the parameter space. Nev-
ertheless, there exists one, crucial, implication of our results which is clearly observable. 
That is 
and, therefore 
P* R* T e* t+I - t+I t 
T P* R* E* t+I - HI t 
(3.12a) 
(3.12b) 
Proposition 3 If the political equilibrium induced by a PEPP system supports the 
complete market allocation, the following should be observed. The implicit rate of return 
it that, along the life cycle, equalizes the discounted value of educational services received 
to the discounted value of social security contributions paid is equal to the implicit rate 
of return 7rt that, along the life cycle, equalizes the discounted value of contributions to 
public education paid to the discounted value of pension payments received. Furthermore, 
if R; = 1 + r; denotes the rate of return on physical capital we have 
In section 5 we test these predictions by using Spanish data. 
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4. Examples of the political equilibria 
While conditions (3.8) and (3.11) are derived from two different games inspection 
shows that they are algebraically equivalent for a given set of preferences, technology 
and initial conditions. To avoid repetition, we will therefore consider their parametric 
implications only for the, relatively more straightforward, defined contribution game and 
just add a few remarks on the defined benefit game. 
4.1 Sustainability of the efficient allocation in the defined contribution game 
Example 1 (Continue). Assume the economy has followed the complete market alloca-
tion until period t. Let k;, h; and E;_l be given. Consider the alternative payoffs open 
to agent t. If she follows the candidate equilibrium strategy her payoff is 
Ut [(E;, Pt); (E;+l' Pt+l)] = log[w; - k;+l - E; - Pt] + 8 log [R;+l (E; + k;+I)]' 
whereas by leaving the pension system she can save Pt = R; E;_l and still invest III 
the education of the young. If she chooses (if = 0, the equilibrium strategy implies that 
(Jf~I = af~I = O. Denoting with starred symbols the values associated to the candidate 
(complete market) equilibrium and with a tilde those induced by the one-period deviation. 
The payoff from deviating is 
with 
where 
and 
Plugging these values in problem (4.1) we get 
-e ~80 * 
at = 1 + 8(1 + ~)o wt , (4.2a) 
and 
k 8 1 + 80 ( ) [(k*)a(h*)l-a] 
t+l = 1 + 81 + 8(1 + ~)o 1 - 0 t t (4.2b) 
h =( ~80 (1- 0))f3 [(k*)af3(h*)I-af3] 
HI 1 + 8(1 + ~)o t t ( 4.2c) 
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The complete market allocation is sustainable as an equilibrium when 
(4.3) 
Comparing the two allocations we have that 
Hence, the complete market allocation is sustainable only if the higher rate of return it 
achieves during the second period compensates for both the consumption lost and the 
smaller total investment undertaken during the first period. Substituting in (4.3), sustain-
ability reduces to 
(1+8)log t*-=-_~ +81og _t+l 20 [w* p*] [R*] W t at RHl 
Algebraic manipulation shows that the latter is equivalent to 
where 
A = (1 - ,8)[1 + 8(1 + ')')0:] < l. 
1 + 0:8 
Inequality (4.4) is therefore necessary and sufficient for the efficient allocation to satisfy 
proposition 2. 
Example 2 (Continue). Again, assume the economy has followed the complete 
market allocation until period t and let k;, h; and E;_l be given. If player t follows the 
candidate equilibrium strategy her payoff is 
Her optimal deviation depends upon both initial conditions and parameter values. 
Equilibrium saving of generation t satisfies 
( 4.5) 
the solution to which depends upon the equilibrium value RH1 . To determine the latter 
we need to know the chosen value of a~, which, along a deviation, solves 
~r Ut [ (a~ , 0); (a~~ 1 , 0) ] 
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The latter, together with the first order conditions of problem (4.5), gives 
a~ = 1'/(1 + 1')w;, if Rt+1 > 1; 
St = 1/(1 + 1')w;, if RH1 > 1; 
a~ + St E [0, w;J, if Rt+1 = 1; 
-e - 0 
at = St = , otherwise. 
Since Rt+1 > 1 if and only if kt+1 :::; (a)1/(1-0:)h t+1 the optimal choice of investment in 
education depends upon the initial conditions (k;, h;). We have two cases: 
('i) If the initial stocks are such that 
k; < B· h;, (4.6) 
where 
then the optimal deviation implies 
and the complete market allocation is sustainable as an equilibrium of the PEPP game if 
and only if 
Since E; = 1'k;+l' deviating is not good if 
The latter is satisfied when 
(1 - ,8)0:+,6(1-0:) > a 
- a + ,8(1 - a) (4.7) 
(ii) If the initial stocks of capital do not satisfy inequality (4.6), the optimal deviation 
for player t is to consume everything immediately. In this case player t leaves the PEPP 
system if 
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Which gives 
R* < 1 
HI - (1 - f3) , 
that is 
R* (* )a-I 1 
t+1 = a xHI ::; (1 - f3) 
The rate of return on capital next period is a function of the two stocks of capital in 
this period. Hence the complete market allocation is sustainable as long as the initial 
conditions satisfy 
(4.8) 
One can see, though, that our parametric restrictions imply that when (4.8) holds, 
the optimal deviation consists in not repaying the expected pension and investing in the 
young generation an amount (if = ,/(1 + ,)w;. 
This shows that, in general, the sustainability of the complete market allocation de-
pends both upon parameter values and initial conditions. More precisely the complete 
market allocation is a SPE of our game for initial conditions x; E (0, BJ and parameter 
values (0:, f3) that satisfy restriction (4.7). When either of these restrictions are not satis-
fied we have two possible situations: (a) if x; E (B, (0) the middle age generation player 
leaves the system and the economy collapses in just one period to the steady state with 
zero amount of both stocks; (b) x; E (0, BJ and restriction (4.7) does not hold generation t 
deviates from the complete market allocation but still invests an amount (if > 0 to finance 
the public education system. 
We consider next sustainability of the complete market allocation along a balanced 
growth path. Condition (4.6) reduces to an inequality involving the growth rate, i. e. 
( 4.9) 
The latter, together with (4.7) and (2.10), defines the subset of the parameter space 
in which the efficient balanced growth allocation can be supported via a PEPP. 
4.2 Sustainability of the efficient allocation in the defined benefit game 
To check if the complete market allocation is sustainable as an equilibrium of the 
defined benefit game we need to find conditions under which the sequence {E;, (Pt -
Tteo)*}~o satisfy restrictions (3.8). In example 1, the use of logarithmic utility functions 
together with h(O, h) = 0 imply that (3.8a) and (3.8c) are always and trivially satisfied. On 
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the other hand, inequality (3.8b) reduces to restriction (4.4) for the defined contribution 
game and the parametric restrictions derived there apply also in this case. 
In example 2 since, again, h(O, h) = 0, inequality (3.8c) always holds. The remaining 
two inequalities can be easily handled in the following way. On one hand if, along the 
balance growth path associated to the capital intensity ratio x*, restriction (4.6) is not 
satisfied then inequality (3.8a) never holds. On the other hand, if x* (or, in the general 
case, xn satisfies (4.6) but the parameter values ((X,;3) do not comply with condition (4.7) 
then (3.8b) is violated. 
Consequently, the complete market allocation is sustainable only for those parameter 
values at which restrictions (2.9), (4.6) and (4.7) are simultaneously satisfied. 
5. The Spanish Case 
Our model uses the idea that, in the real world, Pareto improving intergenerational 
arrangements are not brought about by a benevolent planner. Instead, when achievable, 
they must be implemented by means of well defined political mechanisms in which indi-
vidual generations act as selfish, rational players. We have seen that, depending upon the 
constitutional rules defining the political game and depending upon the constellation of 
parameter values characterizing the utility and the production functions, the selfish pursuit 
of generational utility maximization mayor may not bring about an efficient outcome. 
On the one hand, we have shown that there are large sets of parameter values for which, 
under either one of the two PEPP games considered, the political equilibrium may not 
achieve the complete market efficient allocation. On the other hand, we have also proved 
that the latter is sustainable by means of a relatively simple and, one would be tempted 
to say, "natural" rule of generational conduct. We have also shown that, if this is the 
behavioral rule adopted and the efficient allocation is being supported, we should observe 
an equality between the market rate of interest and the two rates of return implicit in the 
flows of pension payments, taxes, social security contributions and educational services the 
representative agent makes or receives over his life-time. 
In this section, we use Spanish data to compute the values of it and 1ft faced by the 
average Spanish citizen, under the rules in place and the taxes and transfers implemented 
in the years 1990-91. To carry out this computation some stationarity assumptions must be 
added to our model. More precisely, we need to assume that the rules of both the Spanish 
public education and public pension systems will not be changed for the very long future. 
Also, we need to assume that the aggregate burden of taxation and its intergenerational 
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distribution have not and will not vary over the life-time of the individuals that were 
alive in 1990-91. The latter is, indeed, a strong assumption as it practically requires 
demographic stationarity This is unlikely to be true, as most demographic studies predict 
substantial changes in the Spanish demographic structure over the forthcoming 50 years 
(see e.g. Fermindez Cordon [1996] and references therein). 
5.1 Data sources and methodology t 
Consider the general case of an individual living for T periods and let Pt denote 
the probability of survival between age t and t + 1. Denote with it the interest rate at 
which young people "borrow" through public education, and with 7ft the rate of return 
the elderly received from their "investment" in public education. The rates it and 7ft are 
defined implicitly by 
(5.1a) 
(5.1b) 
Our model predicts that rt = it = 7ft should hold, where rt is some appropriately measured 
market interest rate. We are interested in verifying the extent to which Spanish data 
support this prediction. 
In order to pursue this objective we need to resort to several kinds of micro and macro 
data. The choice of the reference year is dictated by the availability of information about 
individual behavior along the whole life cycle. Measurements of E;, Pt, Tr and Tt at 
the individual level and for a number of years long enough to reasonably approximate the 
lifetime of one generation is not available in Spain. At present, there is only one reliable 
source of micro economic observations of the allocation of personal time between school, 
work and retirement at various stages of the life cycle. This is available only for the years 
1980-81 and 1990-91 via the Spanish household budget survey (Encuesta de Presupuestos 
Familiares, or EPF). We have used the 1990-91 EPF because the Spanish public pension 
system underwent a major reform between 1985 and 1987. Short of a few minor changes 
this reform defined the system which is still in place today. 
t For a more complete analysis of the data sets we have used and of many findings we are not reporting here, 
see t-.1ontes (1998). 
30 
The information in the EPF survey allows the estimation of (1) the amount of public 
school services received, (2) the amount of direct and indirect taxes paid, (3) the amount 
of pension contributions paid and, (4) of public contributive pensions received, for each 
individual in the sample. The information in the EPF also affords the computation, for 
each age t = 1, ... , T, of the share of the population which is studying, working or un-
employed and retired. This life-time distribution of activities is reported in Figure l. 
This information is then used to re-construct the life-cycle budget constraints (5.1) for the 
representative Spanish agent. 
To do this we need to compute the life-time distribution of the four kinds of flows which 
enter equations (5.1). The details of these calculations can be found in the Appendix. We 
report here only the main steps. 
First is the life-time distribution of the educational tax burden. From the EPF we 
compute weights a1,·· ., aT, where at represents the (relative) burden of education-related 
taxes charged upon the representative individual at age t. Next we impute to the various 
ages the total amount of public expenditure in education for the budget year 1990. We 
set Tte* = at . TgO for t = 1,···, T, where TgO is the total amount of public expenditure 
in education for the budget year 1990 that is being financed by either direct or indirect 
taxation. The weights a are computed as 
where Tt is the estimated burden of taxation for an individual of age t and Lt is the number 
of individuals of age t in the EPF. 
Secondly, we construct the life-time distribution of total pension payments received 
by computing weights (31, ... , (3T, with (3t denoting the relative pension payment received 
by the representative individual at age t. We compute the flow of pension receipts at age 
t using Pt = (3tP90 for t = 1, ... ,T, where P90 is the total amount of public expenditure 
on contributive pensions in 1990. The weights (3t are 
where Pt is the estimated pension received by the representative individual at age t. 
In the same way, we construct the life-time distribution of the educational transfers 
received by the representative individual. We compute weights 1'1, ... ,1'T with 1't denoting 
the educational transfer received by the representative individual at age t. The flow of 
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educational transfers is then Et = 'Yt . E90 for t = 1, ... ,T, where E90 is the total amount 
of public expenditure on education in 1990. Again, we have 
where Et is the estimated school transfer to the representative individual at age t. 
Finally, we construct the life-time distribution of total pension contributions by com-
puting once again weights 01, ... , OT. The flow of pension-related social security contribu-
tions along the life-cycle is Tt = Ot . Tgo for t = 1, ... , T, where Tgo is the total amount of 
social security taxes levied to finance contributive pension payments in 1990. The weights 
Ot are 
o _ Tt 
t - ,,\,T P 
L...-t=l Tt Lt 
where Tt is the estimated pension contribution, paid by the representative individual at 
age t. Figure 2 reports the time profile of the four sequences of weights at, f3t, 'Yt, Ot. 
To summarize, we use aggregate budget data for: (1) public expenditure on education 
E 90 ; (2) amount of taxes devoted to public education TgO; (3) total amount of social secu-
rity contributions devoted to contributive pensions Tgo; and, (4) total public contributive 
pension payments P90 . We allocate these amounts over the life-cycle of the representa-
tive agent by means of life-time activity weights obtained from the EPF. The life-time 
distribution of these four flows is reported in Figure 3. Equations (5.1) become 
(5.2a) 
99 ( ) 99-t [ 1 t; IIl~lPj ( 1 + 1f) "t . Too - fJt . P90 = 0 (5.2b) 
where we have set T = 99 t and where, given our stationarity assumption, i and 7f are 
treated as constants. Expressions (5.2) are then solved numerically to compute the two 
implicit rates of return associated to the Spanish PEPP in 1990-91. 
t The 1990-91 EPF contains no observation for individuals older than 99 years. 
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5.2 Findings 
Our point estimate of the implicit rate of return on educational investment, received 
by the retired people via pension payments, is 
7'i = 0.040673. 
Our point estimate of the implicit rate of interest at which young people borrow, 
by attending either public schools or public funded schools, is more ambiguous. It de-
pends upon the convention one adopts to handle the budget surpluses and deficits of the 
various Spanish social security administrations. In the budget year 1990, the social secu-
rity administration for workers of the private sector (INSS) realized a surplus of pension 
contributions over pension outlays :j:, while the social security administration for public 
employees (Rep) realized a deficit. The latter was covered by a transfer of funds from the 
general government budget. Recall that our model assumes year by year balanced budget, 
z. e. Pt = Tt for all t. 
One possibility is to get rid of both the INSS surplus and of the Rep deficit by 
assuming that the total amount of social security contributions devoted to contributive 
pensions (T~o) was equal to the public contributive pension payments made in that year 
(Pgo ). In this case our point estimate is 
i 1 = 0.0363599. 
A second possibility is to use the actual social security contributions paid to the two 
administrations in 1990 (T~o)' In this case we have 
i2 = 0.0383995. 
Finally, a third alternative is to add to the total contributions paid in 1990 (T~o) 
the amount transferred from the general government budget to cover the Rep deficit. 
Adopting this wider definition of social security contributions, the implicit rate of interest 
is computed to be 
i3 = 0.0422453. 
A veraging these three point estimates gives 
+ The INSS is divided further in six different funds, some of which exhibited a deficit and other a surplus 
during the same year. Our micro-data do not allow to consider this finer partition. 
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i = 0.039 
which is remarkably close the our point estimate for 7r. 
Over the period 1990-98, the average real rate of return on Spanish 10-year Treasury 
bonds was equal to r = 0.0514, which is substantially higher than any of the values we 
just computed for either 7r or i. It should be noted, though, that, by historical standards, 
the real interest rate on Spanish debt was extremely high in the early part of this decade 
and it has followed a clear downward trend since the middle nineties. So for example, the 
real rate of interest on medium and long term Spanish debt peaked at 6.4% in 1995 and 
it is now equal to 3.1 % and moving further down if anywhere. Assuming that in the long 
run the real interest rate will stay constant at this lower value, we can compute its average 
over an horizon roughly comparable to that of the median voter in 1990. The Spanish 
median voter is a person aged about 45 years, with a conditional life expectancy of about 
35 years as of 1990. We have r = 0.0407 over the period 1990-2008, r = 0.0390 over the 
period 1990-2012 and r = 0.0364 over the period 1990-2025. 
6. Conclusions 
We have studied a three period overlapping generation model with production and 
accumulation of physical and human capital. When the young generation cannot borrow 
to finance investment in human capital, the competitive equilibrium outcome does not 
satisfy either static or dynamic efficiency and the aggregate growth rate of output and 
consumption is lower than under the complete market allocation. We have shown that 
a simple intergenerational transfer agreement could eliminate this problem and induce a 
fully efficient allocation. 
The intergenerational transfer agreement we study is inspired by the argument ad-
vanced in Becker and Murphy [1988]. Accordingly we interpret public funding for education 
as a loan from the middle age to the young generation. The latter uses this loan to finance 
its accumulation of human capital. Symmetrically, the pay-as-you-go public pension sys-
tem can be seen as a way for the former borrowers to repay the capitalized value of their 
educational debt to the previous generation. In this interpretation the two institutions of 
the welfare state, public education and public pensions, support each other and achieve a 
more efficient allocation of resources over time. 
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We have argued that, while a benevolent planner could easily implement such a system 
of lump-sum taxes and transfers, it is not obvious that a benevolent planner is behind 
the design of modern welfare state institutions. Hence it is worth investigating if the 
same equilibrium allocation would arise when the various generations behave in a non-
cooperative fashion and taxes and transfers are decided on a period by period basis by 
means of a majority voting mechanism. In this paper we study two possible constitutional 
systems defining the rules of the dynamic voting game played by the various generations. 
The stylized properties of the two games we consider are such that one resembles a defined 
benefit system and the second is similar to a defined contribution system. 
We characterize classes of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) for the two games. In both 
cases the complete market allocation may result in an equilibrium outcome when certain 
restrictions are satisfied. The efficient allocation is, by no means, the only allocation that 
may be supported as a SPE of the political games we study. Nevertheless we are able to 
characterize two sets of strategies that would implement the efficient allocation. We show 
that both classes of strategies provides testable implications about the rates of return 
implicit in the intergenerational flows of taxes and transfers supporting public education 
and public pension. 
In the last section we test this predictions by computing the "borrowing" and "lend-
ing" rates implicit in the Spanish public education and public pension system. We use 
micro economic and aggregate data for the years 1990-91. The model predicts that the 
borrowing and the lending rates should equal each other and be equal, in turn, to the 
market interest rate. Our point estimates give 0.039 for the borrowing rate, 0.040 for the 
lending rate and 0.039 for a comparable rate of return on long term public debt. 
So far, our reasoning has concentrated on the positive predictions of the model. Nev-
ertheless, there are also important, normative implications of our analysis that may be 
worth mentioning here. The discussion in section 2 and in the first part of section 3, 
suggests that an efficient allocation of resources may be obtained by explicitly linking the 
design of public school financing to that of public pensions provision. 
In particular, our model suggests that, abstracting from redistributive considerations, 
utilization of either public or publicly financed schools and universities should be considered 
as voluntary accumulation of individual debt. Such debt, capitalized at the market rate 
of interest should be paid back, along the citizen's life-time, by means of social security 
contributions levied upon his or her labor income. Repayment of the educational debt can 
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be achieved either by means of a voluntary mortgage plan or by means of a compulsory 
tax. Either choice has some obvious incentive and redistributive implications which are, 
nevertheless, not dissimilar from those faced by the current arrangement for financing 
public education. On the side of retirement pensions, the model requires earmarking some 
tax (paid by individuals) as a source of resources for the public financing of education and 
to capitalize at the the market rate of interest, the amounts paid by each single citizen. 
The capital so accumulated should then be paid out, in form of annuities, to the same 
citizen once retirement age is reached. 
We are not aware of any country in which the welfare legislation expressly establishes 
such a linkage between public education and pensions. Still, the empirical analysis of 
section 5 shows that, at least for the case of Spain, the average amounts generated by 
the current systems are not so far from respecting the fundamental relationship our model 
suggests should characterize an efficient welfare system. In a period, such as the present, 
in which various proposals for reforming the welfare state are on the table, the scheme we 
have so briefly described here may deserve a more careful consideration. 
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Appendix: Data sources and their treatment 
A.I Data sources 
Our sources of data are the following. 
We obtain the aggregate expenditure on public education from the Estadistica del 
Casto Publico en Educaci6n (EGPE 1995, in Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencia (1995)) 
and the Encuesta sobre Financiaci6n y Casto de la Ensenanza Privada (EFGEP 1990-91, 
in INE (1992)). The first data base contains public expenditure for each schooling level, the 
second reports the amount of public funding going to private schools (centros concertados). 
Aggregate tax revenues are obtained from the Cuentas de las Administraciones Publicas 
(I G AE (1991 b) ). From this we extract the share of total tax revenues allocated to financing 
public expenditure on education, excluding the fraction that is covered with public debt. 
Aggregate flows of public pension payments are also obtained from the Cuentas de las 
Administraciones Publicas (IGAE (1991b)) and Actuaci6n Econ6mica y Financiera de las 
Administraciones Publicas (IGAE (1991a)). 
The conditional survival probabilities at each age are equal to those obtained by the 
latest mortality tables published by the National Statistical Institute (INE) with reference 
to the year 1990 
The aggregate data do not allow the study of individual life-cycle behavior. To do 
this we use a Spanish household budget survey (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares, or 
EPF (INE (1991)) carried out by INE in 1990-91. This survey contains data on individ-
ual income, expenditure, personal characteristics and demographic composition for 21,155 
households and 72,123 Spanish citizens. This survey is representative of the entire Spanish 
population and is calibrated on the Spanish Census data. 
A.2 Treatment of the data 
A.2.I Life-time distributions 
We now detail how, using the data in the EPF, we calculated the life-time distribution 
of the four flows associated to the two public systems. 
The information in the EPF allows the estimation of the contributions and payments 
associated to the two public systems for each individual in the sample. These contribu-
tions and payments depend upon the labor market condition of the individual. Thus, we 
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have considered five states in with each individual can be. For each state we compute 
contributions and payments the individual receives or makes. These five states are: 
(E) Student. If the individual is enrolled in a school or university receiving public funds. 
The individual is then receiving a transfer (En, of an amount equal to the average 
cost of a pupil of his/her age attending a school of the kind he/she specifies, during 
the fiscal year 1990-91. The same individual contributes toward financing of public 
education through a portion of his/her direct and indirect taxes, (Tl). 
(W) Worker. If the individual works, he pays social security contributions, (Tt) and taxes 
to support public education, (Tf). 
(R) 
(U) 
Retired. We consider as retired only those individuals receiving a contributive pension 
(pI) . Retired individuals are also financing the public educational system with a 
portion of their taxes (Tti ). 
Unemployed. If an individual receives unemployment benefits he/she is financing the 
public pension system through the social security contributions paid, (Tt). Once 
again, the unemployed are also financing the public education system with a portion 
of their taxes (TD. 
(I) Inactive. Here we include all the individuals that are not in any of the previous four 
states. These individuals only pay taxes (TD, if this is recorded in the EPF. 
These five states are mutually exclusive. For the very rare cases in which the same 
individual in the EPF reports to be in two or more of them, we create two or more 
"artificial" individuals and increase correspondingly the sample size. We define the universe 
of states to be 5 = {E, W, P,U,I}. The total population at each age t = 1, ... , T is 
I:,sEsLt(S), with Lt(s) equal to the number of individuals of age t that are in state s. 
Denote the share of the population of age t in state s as f1t(s) = Lt(s)/I:,sEsLt(S), with 
I:,sESf1t(S) = 1. For each t and s E 5, f1t(s) is the probability that an individual be in 
state s at age t. 
A.2.1 Public education system 
In Spain, public financing of education is allocated in part to public schools and in 
part to a special kind of private schools, centros concertados, by means of school vouchers 
to students. At the compulsory school level (up to age 14 in 1990, 16 in the current 
legislation) schooling is completely free. After that, students attending public institutions 
pay only a small fraction of the total cost, the rest being born by general tax revenues. 
Students attending private institutions bear the full cost. 
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Cost of public schooling 
For each educational level (primary, secondary, higher and other) we have computed 
the real, per-pupil public expenditure on education for various types of schools (public and 
concertados) and for the public universities. 
The EPF reports if an individual is enrolled at school, the type of school (public or 
private) and the level he/she is attending. This information is enough to compute the total 
number of students in each level, type of school and age group. 
The criterion we followed to compute the cost of schooling for each "kind" of student 
(age t, level j, type k of school) is the following. From the EGPE and the EFGEP we 
obtain the actual total amount of public expenditures for each kind (kj) of school. We 
divide these amounts by the total number of pupils attending each. This gives us the 
effective per-student cost for each kind kj of school, Ejk. From the EPF we compute how 
many students of age t are attending a school of kind kj. Using this, we estimate public 
school expenditure on the representative individual at each age t as 
Et = JLt(£) L L JLt(£jk)Eik = JLt(£)Et 
kETC jENE 
where JLt(£) denotes the fraction of the population of age t which is attending school, NE 
is the universe of educational levels, TC is the universe of types of schools. Finally JLt (£jk) 
is the portion of students of age t enrolled in the educational level j in a school of type k. 
The age distribution of public education "borrowing" is 
Hence, it is the share of (life-time total) education-related transfers the representative 
individual receives at age t. 
Financing of the public education system 
On the financing side we need to compute the amount of education-related taxes paid 
by the representative individual at age t. The taxes we consider are the following: personal 
income tax (Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Fisicas, or IRPF) , Value Added Tax 
(VAT), special and other local taxes. 
The EPF provides detailed information about the income flow of each individual, and 
the wealth and consumption baskets of each household. This allows a detailed reconstruc-
tion of the various taxes paid by an individual, which we then aggregate in a total burden 
of taxation (Tl), for individual i of age t. We calculate the average tax paid by a person 
of age t as 
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where T; is the average tax paid by an individual in state s, at age t. 
Given the values Tt for t = 1", . ,T the computation of the life-time distribution of 
the total investment in public education is straightforward, 
Tt 
at = -=---
'£'[=1 TtLt 
Hence at represents the relative burden of taxation charged upon the representative indi-
vidual at age t, for t = 1, ... ,T, Call this the age distribution of the total tax burden. 
To impute the flow of real expenditures in education to the various years of one's life 
we need to scale the coefficients at by the actual public expenditure in education. We 
retrieve this from IGAE (1991b), call it Tgo. Then we compute as Tr = at . TgO for 
t = 1, ... ,T, the investment in public education for the representative agent. 
A.2.2 Public pensions 
Public contributory pensions are provided by the following programs. The "Gen-
eral Social Security Regime" (Regimen General de la Seguridad Social, or RGSS) is the 
main one and cover most private sector employees plus a (small but growing) number 
of public employees. The five plans included in the "Special Social Security Regimes" 
(Regimenes Especiales de la Seguridad Social, or RESS) are, respectively, for the self-
employed (Regimen Especial de Trabajadores Autonomos or RETA) , the agricultural work-
ers and small farmers (Regimen Especial Agrario or REA), the domestic employees (Regimen 
Especial de Empleados de Hogar or REEH) , the sailors (Regimen Especial de Trabajadores 
de Mar or RETM) and the coal miners (Regimen Especial de la Mineria del Carbon or 
REM C). Finally, there exists a seventh, special pension system for the public employees ( 
Regimen de Clases Pasivas, or RCP. 
Financing the public contributive pension system 
All seven pension regimes are of the pay-as-you-go-type and, presumably, self-financing t. 
To estimate the life-time distribution of social security payments we identified all individu-
als in the EPF paying social security contributions, and split them among the seven plans. 
For each individual we have enough information, either from the EPF or from current leg-
islation (e.g. for public employees) to compute the "fictitious income" (bases de cotizacion 
and haberes reguladores) upon which pension contributions are being charged. To each of 
the fictitious incomes we apply the social security contribution rate, as specified by the 
1990-91 legislation, for the pension regime in which the individual was enrolled. Aggre-
gating these amounts over all the individuals of age t, we obtain, for each t = 1, ... ,T, the 
amount of social security contributions paid by individuals in state W (TtW ) and state U 
(Tfi). The social security contribution paid by the representative agent at age t is then 
Tf = fJ,t (W) . TtW + fJ,t (U) . Tt' 
t The RGSS shows a surplus. The five special regimes show small deficits. 
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Also in this case we compute weights by setting 
b - Tf 
t - ""T P 
L...-t=l Tt Lt 
Finally, from IGAE (1991a) and IGAE (1991b) we obtain the total amount of social security 
contributions paid to the seven plans during the year 1990, T~o. In our simulation we use 
Benefits of the public pension system 
rp* - $: r,P t - Ut· gO 
The Spanish social security system provides five types of contributive pensions: old-
age, disability, widowers, orphans, and other relatives. We have not considered payments 
of non-contributive pensions as part of our scheme, as they are not financed by means of 
social security contributions. 
In the EPF we are told if an individual is a pension recipient, what kind of pension 
he or she is receiving and in which amount. The average contributive pension received at 
each age t is therefore easily computed as 
() " k LiEk pf ()-Pt = Jjt P . L Jjt(P ). L (pk) = Jjt P Pt 
kETP t 
where Jjt (p) is the fraction of the population of age t receiving a contributive pension, T P 
is the universe of kinds of contributive public pensions, Jjt (p k ) is the portion of pensioners 
at age t receiving a pension of type k , Pt is the actual pension received by individual i of 
age t and Lt (pk ) is the number of individuals of age t receiving a pension of type k. 
As in the previous cases, the life-time weights are computed as 
Finally, from IGAE (1991a) and (1991b) we obtain the total contributive pension 
payments effectively made, by the seven regimes, during the year 1990, Pgo . The amounts 
used in our calculations are, therefore, Pt = f3t . Pgo . 
Figure 1: Life-time distribution amoung activities. 
E= student, W= worker, U= unemployed, R= retired. l-E-W-U-R= inactive, 
not reported. 
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Figure 2: Life-time distribution of tax-transfer shares. 
Units are percentage of total national amounts, per citizen. 
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Figure 3: Life-time distribution of tax and transfer flows. 
Units are pesetas per capita. 
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